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Modelling in the Humanities:  
Linking Patterns to Principles 
Rens Bod ∗ 
Abstract: »Modellieren in den Geisteswissenschaften: Verbindung von Prinzi-
pien und Mustern«. Modelling is ubiquitous in the humanities: while scholars 
do many things, the search for patterns and principles, and the links between 
them, is found in all humanistic disciplines and periods. Modelling in antiquity 
consisted mainly of explaining and constraining patterns by means of princi-
ples. In the early modern period, modelling also included the prediction and 
refutation of patterns by means of these principles. Since the late nineteenth 
century, the focus shifted to interpreting and criticizing patterns by means of 
principles. I will discuss some commonalities between modelling in the humani-
ties and in the sciences. The exploration of different modelling strategies and 
practices in the (history of the) humanities has just begun and may lead to a 
new field coined History and Philosophy of the Humanities (HPH), analogous to 
History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). 
Keywords: Patterns, principles, modelling, exceptions, explaining, understand-
ing, interpretation. 
1.  Understanding the World by Means of Patterns and 
Principles 
The idea that the world can be understood in terms of empirical patterns and 
underlying principles is arguably one of humankind’s most important insights. 
A pattern is a regularity observed across events or artefacts, with or without 
exceptions.1 A principle is a generalization that brings together different pat-
terns under a single denominator and which is usually said to explain the regu-
larities. While patterns are empirical, principles are theoretical. Although pat-
terns and principles had different meanings in different periods, the concepts 
seem to be universal. From China to Europe and from Africa to the Americas, 
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people have searched for regularities and underlying principles in both the 
natural and cultural world.2 
The quest for patterns and principles is not limited to the (natural) sciences, 
but is found in all knowledge-making disciplines, including the humanities.3 
Besides discovering patterns and underlying principles in planetary move-
ments, diseases and in the evolution of species, scholars have also found pat-
terns and principles in the transmission of texts, the evolution of languages and 
the development of artistic, musical and literary styles – to name a few. Com-
ing up with theoretical principles that generalize and explain empirical patterns 
is one thing, but showing that there is indeed an explicit relation between the 
patterns found and the principles proposed is quite another. In fact, the problem 
of understanding the relation between patterns and principles has hardly been 
touched upon in the philosophy of the humanities while it has received consid-
erable attention in the philosophy of science. 
I shall argue that the humanistic practice of connecting patterns to principles 
can best be understood as a form of “modelling”. However, the terms “model“ 
and “modelling” are highly ambiguous in the literature. There appears to be no 
common terminology used by either scientists or philosophers.4 This is not in 
itself problematic as it gives us some freedom to redefine “modelling” in a 
humanistic context. We will see that our notion of modelling has some com-
monalities with notions of modelling used in the natural and social sciences.  
To explore what may be needed for an understanding of modelling in the 
humanities, I shall start with a bird’s eye overview of this modelling practice in 
the history of the humanities. My overview, which focuses on the European 
tradition, suggests that questions such as “How does a philologist reconstruct a 
text from extant copies?”, “How does an historian interpret an historical event 
or process?”, “How does a musicologist analyze a piece of music?” and “How 
does an art historian interpret a painting?” are prime examples of modelling in 
the humanities. Yet they have rarely been analyzed from an epistemological 
perspective. This is partly due to the fact that humanities scholars tend to leave 
their modelling decisions implicit – and sometimes even deny that they are 
“modelling”. One of my long-term goals is to make the implicit decisions in 
humanistic practice explicit. I thus take from the field of historical epistemolo-
gy the notion that knowledge can only be adequately understood if studied in 
its historical development.5 I maintain that modelling is not limited to the digi-
tal humanities, let alone to the sciences, but that concepts from the digital hu-
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manities – where the notion of pattern has been used from its inception6 – may 
help us in studying other humanities disciplines. In doing so, I will paraphrase 
questions like those given above in terms of patterns and principles. Thus the 
question “How does a philologist reconstruct a text from extant copies?” may 
be rephrased as: “What kind(s) of patterns does a philologist extract from ex-
tant copies and on the basis of what principle(s) does s/he use these patterns to 
reconstruct the original text?”. 
We must keep in mind that humanistic practice is not limited to modelling. 
Humanities scholars do many things: they keep alive the works from the past 
through teaching and writing, they build and maintain archives, they aim at 
developing critical consciousness and historical responsibility, and they also 
pose research questions regarding humanistic artefacts. It is in these research 
questions that the notions of patterns and principles, and the relation between 
these two, are fully fleshed out. 
2. Modelling in the Ancient Humanities: Explaining  
and Constraining 
One of the oldest modelling practices in the humanities is found in philology. 
With the establishment of the Library of Alexandria hundreds of thousands of 
manuscripts – and remnants thereof – were brought together. Among the many 
copies of the same text, no two were alike. In some cases the differences were 
modest and had come about because of copying errors, but the discrepancies 
could also be substantial, consisting of whole sentences that appeared to be 
deliberate changes, additions or omissions. There were also texts that had only 
survived in the form of incomplete fragments. How could the original text – the 
archetype – be deduced from all this material? This was the guiding question 
for a long succession of librarians at the Library of Alexandria. Aristophanes of 
Byzantium (c.257-180 BCE) opted for an explicit philological method to figure 
out how an unknown word form in a manuscript can be identified as either an 
archaic word or as an error. He approached this problem on the basis of a con-
cept of analogy (Callanan 1987). If one could establish that an unknown word 
was conjugated or declined following the same pattern as a known word, it 
could be taken as an archaic word; otherwise it was a corrupted word. Aris-
tophanes defined five such patterns or rules that word forms had to comply 
with in order to be described as “analogous” (analogía). The word forms had to 
correspond in regard to gender, case, ending, number of syllables and stress (or 
sound). Aristophanes’s successor, Aristarchus of Samothrace (c.216-c.144 
BCE), added a sixth rule: when comparing two word forms, both had to be 
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compound (complex) or non-compound (simplex) (Schironi 2004). The Alex-
andrian philologists thus used the designation of analogía as the underlying 
principle that generalized over the various rules of comparison. New rules for 
reconstructing manuscripts could be (and in fact were) introduced, but they had 
to follow the principle of analogy. This principle served not only as a generali-
zation of existing patterns and rules but also as a constraint for new rules. 
While there were competing schools as well, in particular the school of Per-
gamon that focused on exceptions (anomalía) rather than rules, the Alexandri-
an method has withstood the test of time as a critical approach to text recon-
struction. We owe a debt of gratitude to the insights of the Alexandrians, as 
well as to succeeding generations of tragedians and historians who employed 
their method, for the editions of Homer, Hesiod, Pindarus, Archilochus and 
Anacreon which have been handed down to us. 
Modelling practices are also found in other ancient humanistic disciplines. 
In their descriptions of the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, the historians 
Herodotus (c.484-425 BCE) and Thucydides (c.460-c.395 BCE) believed they 
could recognize a pattern in past events, namely that of rise, peak and decline. 
Herodotus found this pattern in both people and states, such as the tyrant Pisis-
tratus and Athens, King Croesus and Lydia, and Darius and Persia: their for-
tunes rose and fell. Herodotus considered the pattern to be the basic structure of 
history: “For many states that were once great have now become small, and in 
my lifetime those that are great used to be small.” (Herodotus, Histories, 1.5.) 
Thucydides also contended that the rise and fall of Athens and its disintegration 
during the Peloponnesian Wars had parallels with other historical periods. He 
believed that this pattern was analogous to human nature and could therefore 
serve as an “aid for interpreting the future” (Thucydides, History of the Pelo-
ponnesian War, 1.22.). 
The Greek historian Polybius (c.200-c.118 BCE) found a different historical 
pattern, namely in the history of Rome. Polybius expressed great admiration for 
the way Rome succeeded where the Greeks had failed. Rome, he argued, refut-
ed the pattern that had occurred in the history of Athens, i.e. a cycle of monar-
chy, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy and, via tyranny, back to monarchy 
again (Polybius, Histories, 1.1-2.). Unlike Athens and other cities, Rome was 
immune to this cycle – and therefore to decline – because of its mixed constitu-
tion. Rome’s governmental structure at the time of Polybius included a monar-
chy (the consuls), an aristocracy (the senate) and a democracy (the people’s 
assemblies). According to Polybius this simultaneity broke the cyclical pattern, 
which turned the history of Rome into a non-cyclical history, or so he believed 
(ibid., 1.4.).  
Although we know nowadays that Rome was also subject to decline, Polyb-
ius did try to find an explanatory principle for the two patterns he observed: the 
rise, peak and decline of the Greek city states, and Rome’s continuous flourish-
ing without decline. His principle of mixed vs non-mixed constitutions leads in 
HSR Suppl. 31 (2018)  │  82 
the first case to prosperity and in the second to decline. Of course, Polybius’ 
principle could only generalize over two patterns (one of which turned out to 
be incorrect), but he did search for a principle which explained the patterns he 
found. This principle could even make predictions for other city states, alt-
hough Polybius never applied his principle to other situations.  
The search for theoretical principles underlying observed patterns is also 
found in the study of literature, art and music. For example, Aristotle found 
regularities in classical tragedies that he explained by a set of poetical princi-
ples for “good” narratives (Aristotle, Poetica, XXIV, 60a16). These general 
principles were meant as descriptive generalizations underlying the patterns 
found in plays, poems and stories, but Aristotle’s principles were soon used 
prescriptively by Horace and others as a normative guideline for constructing 
new poems. In the field of art history, Pliny found a pattern in Greek and Ro-
man art, which could be defined by mathematical proportions known as the 
canon (Pliny, Naturalis historia, 34. 55.) Although Pliny did not find principles 
for what he called “beautiful” art, he did find mathematical principles for 
“good” art. In musicology, Aristoxenus found melodic regularities in Greek 
musical pieces, which he tried to explain by a few underlying principles that 
constrained the space of possible melodies without explicitly producing melo-
dies (Gibson 2005, 169). These poetic, artistic and musical principles con-
strained the set of possible patterns without producing new pieces of theatre, art 
or music. 
The relation between patterns and principles in Antiquity can thus best be 
described in terms of constraints. Patterns in the humanities cannot be formally 
reduced to principles, like in Euclidian mathematics. Instead, principles in the 
ancient humanities define the conditions or constraints within which these 
patterns and rules can play out. These principles are mainly used to explain 
patterns, and sometimes to predict and interpret patterns. This gives us a first 
clue as to the relation between principles and patterns. 
3. From the Medieval to the Early Modern Era: Predicting 
and Refuting 
After the fall of the West-Roman empire, European learning was concentrated 
in monasteries, cathedral schools and (later) universities. The basic university 
curriculum was formed by the artes liberales, which were subdivided into the 
so-called trivium, consisting of grammar, logic and rhetoric, and the quadrivi-
um, which consisted of geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and music. While the 
practice of modelling continued, it was made subservient to biblical-theological 
authority. History writing in the West was dominated by Universal Histories 
that consisted of a narrative pattern that divided the time between the Creation 
and the Last Judgment into different periods (Mortley 1996). The underlying 
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principle was the notion of biblical coherence: all narrative patterns had to be 
in accordance with biblical narrative. In poetics the main goal was to bring 
textual interpretation in accordance with Biblical interpretation (Preminger, 
Hardison, and Kerrane 1974). In philology, the Alexandrian method was brief-
ly revived by Lupus de Ferrière (c.805-62), but philological practice in the 
West remained subservient to ecclesiastical authority (Gariepy 1967). Roger 
Bacon maintained that the old Latin manuscripts of the church fathers were the 
first authority in any attempted reconstruction of biblical texts (Roger Bacon, 
Opus maius, part III.). 
With the advent of humanism, we see a renewed interest in empirical pattern 
searching and modelling. In philology, Angelo Poliziano (1454-1494) goes 
beyond the Alexandrian philological approach when he takes into account the 
genealogical relationship between extant copies (Poliziano 1970-1971). 
Poliziano realized that a group of completely consistent sources could still pose 
a problem. Assume that a number of sources – A, B, C and D – all agree on one 
point, and that B, C and D are entirely dependent on A for their information.7 
Should B, C and D nevertheless be included as extra evidence of the authentici-
ty of A? According to Poliziano they should not: if derived sources were mutu-
ally consistent, they should be identified and eliminated (Poliziano 1970-1971, 
I.39.). Sources should be ranked genealogically so that their dependence in 
regard to an older source becomes clear. One anomalous manuscript can refute 
dozens of consistent manuscripts purely on the basis of its position in the gene-
alogical ranking. This underlying principle is known as the eliminatio-principle 
(from eliminatio codicum descriptorum) or the “oldest source principle” (Maas 
1960, 2). 
Poliziano used his method with exemplary precision. His quest for genealo-
gies of manuscripts resulted in highly accurate reconstructions of Terence, 
Virgil, Seneca, Propertius and Flaccus. But it is mainly after Poliziano that his 
philological principle revealed some of the most surprising patterns found in 
the early modern period, especially in the work of the philologist and historian 
Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540-1609). Scaliger aimed at unifying all ancient 
histories (Graeco-Roman, Babylonian, Egyptian, Persian and Jewish) so as to 
create the definitive historical chronology (Grafton 1983-1993). Scaliger there-
fore reconstructed various historical texts, among them Manetho’s list of Egyp-
tian dynasties. Using the information from these sources, particularly about the 
duration of the different dynasties, Scaliger was able to date the beginning of 
the first Egyptian dynasty to 5285 BCE. To his dismay this date was nearly 
1300 years before the generally accepted day of Creation, which according to 
biblical chronology had to be around 4000 BCE. In order to “save the phenom-
ena”, Scaliger introduced a new time pattern – the tempus prolepticon – a time 
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before time (Scaliger 1658 [1606]). He placed every event that occurred before 
the Creation, such as the early Egyptian kings, in this proleptic time. Scaliger’s 
solution may come across as artificial, but for a Protestant in around 1600 it 
was inconceivable to cast doubt on the Bible. Yet at the same time Scaliger was 
too consistent to give up on his philological method. It was only a couple of 
generations later when scholars and philosophers like Isaac Vossius and Spino-
za realized that the only possible interpretation of Scaliger’s result was that the 
earliest Egyptian kings had actually lived before the biblical date of the Crea-
tion. This meant that the Bible could not be taken seriously as a historical 
source. Scaliger’s pattern of world history conflicted with biblical chronology, 
and this triggered a chain of biblical criticism that finally resulted in the En-
lightenment.8 
Thus, in the early modern era, a temporal pattern was no longer neutral but 
could be used to refute a formerly well-established world view. This is not to 
say that patterns were neutral in Antiquity – Herodotus and Thucydides also 
interpreted their findings, but their pattern (of rise, peak and fall) corroborated 
their world view rather than challenged it. In the early modern period, however, 
the discovery of certain patterns became critical as they were in opposition to 
the then accepted world view which they effectively refuted. This was not only 
the case for Scaliger’s discovery, but also for discoveries in other humanities 
disciplines. In linguistics, Johannes de Laet designed a number of principles for 
comparing words in different languages, showing that there could be no rela-
tionship whatsoever between American-Indian languages and Hebrew. This 
effectively refuted the idea that Hebrew was the cradle of all languages (de 
Laet 1643). In music theory no hard distinction – with whatever underlying 
harmonic principles – could be found to distinguish consonant from dissonant 
intervals. This rebutted the centuries-old Pythagorean cosmic harmony.9  
4. The Modern Period: Interpretation and Criticism 
The first conceptual distinction between the notions of “humanities” and “sci-
ence” was put forward in Giambattista Vico’s Scienza Nuova (1725), but his 
work was ignored for almost a hundred years. It was in the nineteenth century 
when Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) gave a foundation for the disciplines that 
we nowadays call humanities. According to Dilthey the humanities 
(Geisteswissenschaften) are concerned primarily with verstehen (understand-
ing), whereas science (Naturwissenschaften) is about erklären (explaining) 
(Dilthey 1883, 29-30). Humanities scholars would be failing if they observed, 
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counted, measured or hunted for apparent regularities. What they should be 
doing is searching for the motives and intentions of historical figures. Laying 
bare these inner mainsprings is more important than studying the external man-
ifestations of the human mind. In this context one also uses the distinction 
introduced by Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) between an “idiographic” 
approach to knowledge (which is the study of the unique and the special) and a 
“nomothetic” way of studying (which seeks to generalize) (Windelband 1904). 
While the humanities were supposed to search for the unique, the sciences 
would deal with the general. This vision turned out to be extremely influential 
as it gave the humanities a powerful identity enabling them to differentiate and 
emancipate themselves from the other disciplines.  
This constitutive separation between the humanities and sciences, however, 
did not correspond to actual practice in the humanities before the nineteenth 
century, as we have already seen. The search for patterns and principles and the 
search for a connection between them (modelling), both before and after the 
nineteenth century, simply continued in all humanities disciplines. When 
Dilthey’s and Windelband’s visions were gaining ground – from the early 
twentieth century onwards – modelling practices in the humanities continued. 
Such practices are found not only in linguistics (e.g. De Saussure, Jakobson) 
but also in philology (Lachmann, Greg), musicology (Schenker, Lerdahl), 
literary theory (Propp, Todorov), art history (Wölfflin, Panofsky) and historiog-
raphy (the Annales school), just to name a few. 
For example, in philology Karl Lachmann (1793-1851) created a principle-
based method of text reconstruction that is known as stemmatology.10 In this 
method, an external representation (“model”) of surviving texts is built – a 
history tree or stemma – that can be used to reconstruct the original text from 
the patterns found in surviving texts. Many elements of stemmatology had 
already been in use for centuries, such as the concept of an archetype (the Al-
exandrians), the genealogical method (Poliziano), as well as the notion of a 
history tree which was used by Carl Johan Schlyter in 1827 (see Figure 1). 
However, Lachmann unified these separate elements into a systematic whole.11 
He believed that a history tree or stemma could be constructed on the basis of 
one underlying philological principle: if an error is created in a version of a 
text then all descendants of that text contain the same common error. On the 
basis of differences between extant texts, a stemma could be constructed. 
Lachmann distinguished three phases: Recensio (determining the genealogical 
relationship between the surviving texts in the form of a history tree), Examina-
tio (deciding on the primitive text) and Emendatio (emending so as to recon-
struct the archetype). Thus modelling in stemmatology was not just a matter of 
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linking patterns in manuscripts to the underlying philological principle, but also 
of creating an intermediary representation, a stemma, which facilitated the 
modelling process. 
Figure 1: The Earliest Known Representation of a Stemma by Carl Johan 
Schlyter (1827) 
 
 
In art history, the analysis of stylistic patterns was initiated by Giovanni Morel-
li (1816-1891), who created detailed taxonomies of pictorial representations of 
ears, noses, hands and other parts of the body, as well as clouds, leaves, folds 
and individual brushstrokes in Italian art (Morelli 1890-1893). His underlying 
principle was that an artist’s personal style is found in the details of a painting 
over which the artist has no control. Connoisseurs and art historians were 
trained in the Morellian method and learned how to compare stylistic patterns 
across a wide corpus of paintings (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Giovanni Morelli’s Study of the Depiction of Ears by Eight Different 
Renaissance Artists (Morelli 1980-1993) 
 
Morelli’s method was also used in archaeology to classify Greek vases and 
reliefs. But his stylistic analysis was entirely based on details. It is thanks to the 
work of Heinrich Wölfflin (1864-1945) that we have stylistic principles with 
which not only all the separate parts of a work of art can be examined, but also 
their relationship to the whole. In his Kunstgeschichtliche Grundbegriffe 
(1915), Wölfflin introduced a gamut of new stylistic concepts that he grouped 
in five pairs of opposites in order to characterize style transitions (in particular 
from Renaissance to baroque). He defined notions like linear versus painterly 
representations, flat versus deep composition, closed versus open forms and 
clear versus diffuse representations, among others. His notions still form the 
basis of historical art analysis today. Yet Wölfflin’s principles were also criti-
cized by people like Walter Benjamin who in his essay Strenge Kunstwissen-
schaft (1933), who argued that Wölfflin neglected the social and cultural inter-
pretations of paintings. Later work by Aby Warburg and Erwin Panofsky did 
take such interpretations into account. 
The quest for relating patterns to principles is also found in literary studies. 
While it may not be surprising to find pattern and principle-seeking practices in 
the work of early formalist and structuralist literary scholars like Propp, Jakob-
son and Todorov, it is less well-known that those who reacted to and criticized 
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structuralism – the post-structuralists – were also relying on patterns (as well as 
principles). This becomes particularly clear if we look at the work of Roland 
Barthes (1915-1980), who built on but also went beyond the long tradition set 
out by the formalists and structuralists. In his book S/Z (1970), Barthes started 
his famous analysis of Balzac’s story Sarrasine by organizing the novella into a 
complex pattern consisting of 561 reading units (“lexies”). He then analyzed 
these units in terms of different meaning attributions, showing that Balzac’s 
realistic text is full of symbolic and other connotations which can be interpreted 
in various different ways by the reader. 
With these examples I do not want to say that modelling was uncontrover-
sial in twentieth-century humanities. In historiography, for example, the oppo-
sition was strongly felt. While social-economic historians and (pre-war) cultur-
al historians like Spengler and Toynbee searched for general patterns and 
underlying principles in history, their results were criticized by narratologists 
(who argued that only the “narrative” could give an account of an absent past), 
the critical school (which claimed that only general criticism could demytholo-
gize the past) and by postmodernists (who went farthest by arguing that any 
claim to historical truth is subject to deconstruction). Yet a closer look reveals 
that the pattern-rejecting historians criticized not so much patterns per se but 
“universal” patterns that were claimed to be culture independent. Their criti-
cism made way for a quest for different patterns that were culture specific or 
ideological. In fact, some historians have found patterns in a historical epoch 
by employing categories and principles from that period. If a historian knows 
the rules of fifteenth-century art theory or rhetoric, for example, they can use 
them to analyze and interpret works of art, texts and other, even less obvious 
objects, dating from that time (Baxandall 1971). 
In musicology and linguistics, as well as in the more recent disciplines of 
theatre studies, film studies, television studies and media studies, we find prac-
tices of pattern searching and the interpretation of these patterns by means of 
deeper principles. In film studies, for example, scholars have developed precise 
methods for analyzing a film by integrating insights from semiology, literary 
studies and linguistics. We see this perhaps most clearly in the work of Chris-
tian Metz (1931-1993), who developed his “Grande Syntagmatique,” in which 
he called the building blocks of film syntagmas. In the spirit of Noam Chom-
sky’s generative syntax (Chomsky 1957), Metz designed a number of theoreti-
cal principles to create a hierarchical organization for these syntagmas so that 
the cinematic structure of the film as a whole could be visualized and interpret-
ed. Such a cinematic narrative structure is represented by a tree diagram where 
the leaves of the tree represent film scenes and the branched structure reflects 
the relationships between the scenes (see figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Christian Metz’s “Grande Syntagmatique” 
 
From: Buckland 2000, 115. 
 
This formal, principle-based analysis into building blocks has led to some 
surprising results. For example, the narrative structure of the popular series 
CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, which has dragged on for years, has been 
found to consist of only eight narrative building blocks that are endlessly re-
shuffled (Löwe, Pacuit, and Saraf 2009). This kind of narrative modelling thus 
uses an intermediate representation: the tree diagram. 
It often occurs, however, that films, as well as novels and other narratives, 
cannot be represented by a tree diagram. This happens when narratives are 
neither linear nor tree-branching, but form a network that fans out and consists 
of a multiplicity of junctions without a clear beginning or end. Such a concept 
of an interwoven structure was articulated by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guat-
tari, who introduced the term “rhizome” to this end in Mille plateaux (1980).12 
The term rhizome is taken from botany, where it refers to an underground, 
usually horizontal, stem that often bends upwards again and thus creates a new 
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plant. A rhizome is more complex than a hierarchical tree structure used in, for 
example, stemmatic philology. In a rhizome the different parts that are split up 
hierarchically in a tree structure can also be directly connected to one another. 
In mathematics and information technology, a rhizomatic structure is covered 
by the concept of graph.13 Thus the structure of a website or a video game 
cannot normally be represented as a linear or hierarchical structure but as a 
rhizomatic one. Both tree-diagrams and rhizomes are models in the humanities 
that mediate between patterns and their underlying principles. 
5. Humanistic versus Scientific Modelling 
While modelling in the long-term history of the humanities may seem quite 
different from modelling in the sciences, we find some commonalities as well. 
Our notion of modelling in the humanities is in fact analogous to the notion of 
modelling in Mary Morgan’s and Margaret Morrison’s influential work Models 
as Mediators (1999). According to Morgan and Morrison, phenomena in phys-
ics and economics can usually not straightforwardly be derived from underly-
ing theories, but need to be connected by external models that serve as a kind 
of mediators. Their notion of linking between phenomena and theory in the 
sciences by means of models makes a strong analogy with our notion of linking 
between patterns and principles. 
There is an important difference as well. Morgan and Morrison exclusively 
focus on models as external representations of the objects or phenomena under 
study. We have seen that such a notion of model is not valid for all humanities 
disciplines. In many of these disciplines, modelling consists of describing the 
steps needed to link patterns to principles. While some humanities disciplines 
do indeed use external representations such as trees, graphs or rhizomes to link 
patterns to principles (see above), other disciplines use procedures, rules or 
constraints to do this job. Thus models in the humanities can consist of either 
internal representations (like a set of rules for deriving the archetype of extant 
texts) or external representations (like a tree diagram for analyzing a film). But 
regardless of whether humanistic modelling makes use of internal or external 
representations, the main goal of linking patterns to principles is to explain, 
understand and interpret the expressions of the human mind. 
My quick overview of modelling in the humanities has of course only 
scratched the surface. The exploration of different methodologies, strategies 
and practices in the humanities has just begun. But it has led to new questions, 
such as: what is the epistemological place of the notion of pattern or regularity 
in the humanities and how does it differ from the sciences? How can we under-
                                                             
13  See Chartrand 1985. See also Moretti 2005. 
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stand the relation between the unique and the general? And how can singular 
events that are not part of a pattern be modelled in the humanities (see also the 
discussion below)? What we need to properly deal with these questions is a 
new discipline that we would call History and Philosophy of the Humanities 
(HPH), which should operate on par – and possibly in close alliance with – the 
already existing History and Philosophy of Science (HPS). 
6.  Discussion 
Question (Fotis Jannidis): How do we reconcile patterns and the unique in 
the humanities? What about practices that are not defined by an interest in 
looking for patterns? 
Answer: Indeed, as I have stated in the introduction, not all practices in the 
humanities are defined in terms of patterns and principles. But it should be kept 
in mind that patterns are not in opposition to unique events. Patterns actually 
consist of unique events or artefacts, and a unique artefact can often (but not 
always, as we will discuss below) be connected to underlying principles as 
well, so as to explain, understand, interpret or criticize that artefact. Take as an 
example the field of art history (but any other field would do): according to 
Wölfflin (see above), Baroque paintings share a certain common pattern, that 
is, they can be understood in terms of a number of stylistic principles typical 
for that style. But this also means that a single, unique Baroque painting can 
just as well be described by these principles: as a singular Baroque painting it 
shares common features with other Baroque paintings. At the same time, the art 
historian may be interested in the differences between the singular painting and 
other Baroque paintings (e.g. by highlighting the uniqueness of Caravaggio’s 
style), but in all cases the art historian will have to refer to the particular Ba-
roque pattern (and possibly the underlying principles). Thus even if one is 
interested in studying a single painting or literary work or musical piece, one 
may still use patterns and generalized principles in order to interpret a single 
artwork. And this is what I have called modelling.  
Question (Fotis Jannidis): But how do we deal, then, with exceptions that do 
not fit patterns? 
Answer: This is an interesting issue, especially if we consider exceptions 
that neither fit a pattern nor connect to underlying principles. As I said above: 
while modelling is found in all humanities disciplines, it is not the only practice 
in the humanities. Nevertheless, the problem of dealing with exceptions is 
found in almost all knowledge-making disciplines. And yet, common wisdom 
has it that the essential difference between the humanities and the natural sci-
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ences lies in the notion and treatment of exceptions.14 The statement that “the 
exception proves the rule” seems unthinkable in natural science – although we 
should stress here that in the humanities this pronouncement is mainly used in 
the prescriptive tradition of secondary school grammars. All the same, there are 
most certainly exceptions in the humanities. However they are not solely to be 
found in the humanities, but in the natural and social sciences too. Theoretical 
physics, with its universal laws, is sometimes referred to as the only exception-
less discipline. This may represent a possible demarcation. Yet this demarca-
tion characterizes not so much the difference between science and the humani-
ties, as between theoretical physics and other fields. While theoretical physics 
permits no scope for exceptions, applied physics is full of ad hoc corrections, 
phenomenological constants, normalizations and so-called provisos. Although 
the universal laws of nature are considered to be exception-free, in mathemati-
cal derivations and explanations of specific phenomena ad hoc approximations 
and corrections are used more than once.15 We cannot assert anything other 
than that there is a gradual scale from disciplines with the least exceptions to 
those with the most. While theoretical physics reflects an ideal picture, it is not 
feasible for most natural sciences, such as biology, geology, forensic science 
and even chemistry, let alone for other academic areas. 
In the humanities there is such a gradual shift from almost absolute sound 
shift laws in linguistics to less absolute harmonic rules in musicology to 
changeable culture-specific patterns in history. But there is also a gradual shift 
like this in the natural sciences – from the absolute laws of theoretical physics 
to the more approximate laws in chemistry to the local and variable patterns in 
biology. The eminent biologist Ernst Mayr contended that universal patterns do 
not exist in biology (1997, 62). Mayr admitted that the laws of physics and 
chemistry of course apply to biological systems at a molecular level. In a com-
plex system, though, no biological regularity has ever been observed that com-
plies with the rigorous definition of a “law” in theoretical physics. According 
to Mayr, what biologists mean by a “law” is a pattern that is usually local and 
not universally valid and is moreover often statistical. These regularities are 
widely used in the modelling of biological phenomena, without their being 
reduced to the fundamental physical or chemical laws. 
This brings me to another issue, namely the notion of autonomous levels of 
explanation, which I take from the philosopher of science Philip Kitcher 
(1984). In biology the set of principles and explanations used at cell level is 
different from that at an ecological level, for instance. This does not exclude 
the reduction – sooner or later – of complex biological processes to physical 
ones. However, it does not always make sense to reduce a biological phenome-
non to the ”deepest” principles of elementary particle physics in order to ex-
                                                             
14  For an overview of this discussion, see Bod 2013a, 356-8. 
15  For an overview, see Cartwright 1983. 
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plain and understand it. In line with Kitcher I would argue that there are also 
autonomous levels of explanation, understanding and interpretation in the hu-
manities, which have their own set of principles, just like in biology and other 
disciplines. Obviously the laws of (particle) physics also apply to the human 
brain, and therefore also indirectly to the products of that brain, and thus to 
humanistic artefacts. Yet it is not the case that we need to consult biology or 
physics for the modelling of humanistic artefacts like a literary work, a painting 
or a piece of music. The cognitive and neurosciences have produced important 
insights into the study of literature, art and music,16 but it becomes impossible 
and even senseless if we try to explain, understand or interpret a play by 
Shakespeare, a painting by Rembrandt or a symphony by Beethoven in terms 
of the sum total of all brain activities relevant at the time. It proves to be the 
case that autonomous principles of literary, artistic and musical analysis deliver 
the most insightful interpretations.  
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